Crisis Management for a Conflict with North Korea

Vivekananda International Foundation | English | AcademicThink | Oct. 6, 2025 | Geopolitical Conflict and Disputes

The AUKUS agreement envisions Australia acquiring nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) with support from the US and UK, raising Russia's security concerns about the safety of its strategic nuclear deterrent based in the Pacific Fleet at Vilyuchinsk. Despite initial US commitment, ongoing Pentagon reviews introduce uncertainty about the timeline. According to the 2023 roadmap, Australia is expected to receive in-service Virginia-class submarines by 2032 and 2035, followed by a new Australian-designed SSN in the early 2040s, with a current target of eight submarines that could increase. This capability aims to enhance Australia’s defense posture amidst regional instability, primarily to counter China’s naval expansion, though this marks a strategic shift from Australia’s historical defense focus.

Critics like former Prime Minister Paul Keating and strategist Hugh White argue that AUKUS commits Australia to US-led efforts against China, potentially engaging in conflicts due to reliance on American submarine supply conditional on Australia joining US operations. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute sees AUKUS as necessary to deter China and maintain regional stability. Australia’s deeper military integration with the US, involving bases and joint operations, reflects this stance, underscoring a hostile posture toward Russia and alignment with Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy.

From a Russian security perspective, the RAN’s future SSNs pose a significant threat to the Pacific Fleet’s SSBNs sheltered in the Sea of Okhotsk—a critical "bastion" providing stealth and protection for Russia’s second-strike nuclear capability. Australian SSNs, operating from bases on the west and potentially east coasts, could project power to Russian bases within weeks, threaten SSBNs both in port and at sea, and deliver missile strikes using Tomahawk missiles. This raises the risk of US-Australia combined anti-submarine operations against Russian strategic assets, increasing strategic tensions and possible conflict miscalculations.

Australia’s historical acceptance of hosting US strategic facilities during the Cold War may not equate to current risks, as new submarine bases become potential targets in a heightened conflict scenario. The article suggests Australia should implement measures to mitigate misunderstandings and inadvertent escalation risks linked to its SSN activities. Additionally, implications for India are highlighted, as Australia’s expanded submarine capabilities affect regional dynamics and Indian security planning, given close military ties and shared strategic interests with Australia and the US.

In conclusion, Australia’s growing SSN force, enabled by AUKUS and operating in proximity to Russian and Indian naval strategic assets, will significantly influence regional security balances from the late 2030s onward, demanding careful strategic risk management by Australia, Russia, and India.